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Abstract
This paper deals with tax morale and how norms may evolve over time.
The special focus is on buying black-market services. I apply mech-
anisms from social psychology to explain how personal norms may
evolve due to one’s own past behavior through self-signaling and due
to conformity based on social interactions. These changes over time
result in multiple equilibria, so that the economy can develop stronger
social norms and less evasion over time, or weaker norms and more
evasion in the long run. An economy on a trajectory toward the “bad”
equilibrium may be permanently pushed onto a trajectory toward the
“good” equilibrium by means of a sufficiently strong temporary policy.
Observations from a recent tax reform in Sweden strongly support the
theory and suggest that other policies than enforcement may indeed
be a powerful tool in influencing both behavior and attitudes.
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1 Introduction
Some economies are characterized by a high degree of tax evasion together
with weak social norms for compliance. When norms are weak, the psychic
cost of evasion is low, which results in increased evasion, which in turn weak-
ens the social norm further and so on. The economy is on an inevitable path
toward an equilibrium where everyone evades taxes and there is no social
pressure to comply. Could this path be averted by policy means other than
enforcement? This paper suggests that it could, and a temporary policy
change that is strong enough is sufficient to steer the economy toward an
equilibrium where no one evades and where the social norm urges one to
fully comply.
Combatting tax evasion by means of deterrence works to a certain de-
gree, but in a non totalitarian economy we do not want to audit everyone
and enforcement that is too strong may even backfire.1 Although reducing
the ability to evade improves actual compliance (Kleven et al., 2011), the
willingness to comply is also important to behavior. In an economy where
people actually want to comply, they will do so to a large extent indepen-
dently of enforcement and administrative possibilities. Tax morale refers to
such willingness to comply. Hence, it is important to learn what fosters tax
morale and whether policy interventions could affect it.2 If governments can
influence tax morale, they can increase voluntary, rather than enforced, com-
pliance. This paper presents a theoretical model suggesting how policy could
affect tax morale. Evidence from a recent reform in Sweden shows that the
effects may be substantial.
This paper examines whether or not consumers buy a particular service,
that may be bought from either the white or the black market. Buying
the service without any taxes added and without a receipt allows the con-
sumer to spend more resources on other consumer goods. However, there
may be intrinsic, as well as social, norms that prevent the consumer from
buying the black-market service. This trade-off between pecuniary motives
1See, e.g., Feld and Frey (2002) and Mendoza et al. (2017).
2“If a government can influence a norm, tax evasion can be reduced by policy activities”
(Torgler, 2007, p. 67.)
1
and norms implies that the prevalence of evasion differs across the income
distribution. The largest proportion of individuals buying the black-market
service is found among the middle-income earners. Among those with the
highest and lowest incomes, only those with a very low tax morale buy black-
market services; those with low incomes choose instead to a large extent not
to buy the service at all, while high-income earners can afford to buy it from
the white market; i.e., they pay to avoid the disutility they would get from
violating the norm of compliance. Nordblom and Zˇamac (2012) find that
two psychological mechanisms, self-signaling and normative conformity, are
able to explain how people change their tax morale over the course of their
lives in a way consistent with observed differences between young and old in-
dividuals.3 These mechanisms are also encountered in the present paper. If
one complies (evades) in one period, the action becomes a signal about one’s
type, and one becomes more (less) reluctant to evasion in the next period.
Moreover, through social interactions, one tends to conform to the views of
others. Hence, policies that make more people comply may strengthen their
tax morale and have spillover effects to others as well, strengthening the
overall social norm of tax compliance in the economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses
previous research on tax morale and Section 3 briefly presents some relevant
theories of norm evolution. Section 4 introduces the model where both per-
sonal and social norms influence the decision to evade or not. The proposed
norm-updating mechanisms are applied to analyze the development of tax
morale on personal and social levels. What happens when a policy interven-
tion makes compliance less costly in a pecuniary sense is analyzed in Section
5. Section 6 illustrates that the development of tax morale in Sweden fol-
lowing a recent Swedish tax reform is very much in line with the proposed
theory. Section 7 concludes the paper.
3It is a common finding that older people have a stronger tax morale than do younger.
(see, e.g., Orviska and Hudson, 2003; Braithwaite et al., 2010).
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2 Norms and tax morale
According to the original tax-evasion theory by Allingham and Sandmo
(1972), one evades if the expected utility of consumption when evading ex-
ceeds that of not evading. The only way to combat tax evasion is then to
reduce the possibilities to evade or to make it less profitable. This is also the
main conclusion in Kleven et al. (2011), where Danish taxpayers’ high com-
pliance rates are attributed to the third-party reporting that makes most of
them unable to evade. However, voluntary compliance with tax laws has also
shown to be important for raising tax revenue in nontotalitarian economies.4
Many studies have incorporated measures of tax morale in explaining
compliance behavior and have identified, e.g., guilt and shame as important
deterrents.5 These feelings are in turn based on how the actions coincide with
or deviate from norms, both personal and social. (see, e.g., Gordon, 1989;
Erard and Feinstein, 1994; Myles and Naylor, 1996; Wenzel, 2004, 2005a;
Fortin et al., 2007; Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2007). Individuals who hold an
intrinsic norm of compliance may experience disutility or a feeling of guilt
when evading. Moreover, in an economy with a social norm of compliance,
one who is observed violating that norm may be stigmatized. Kim (2003)
models such stigma associated with evasion, where the degree of stigma in-
creases with the number of honest taxpayers. Besley et al. (2015) assume
that taxpayers hold constant intrinsic norms, while the social stigma attached
with tax evasion may change over time depending on the prevalence of tax
evasion. Also Luttmer and Singhal (2014) argue that the social stigma of
evasion and thereby the personal willingness to contribute to the common
good are lower when evasion is common.
In an influential paper, Cialdini and Trost (1998) make the distinction
between descriptive norms, those that explain what others do, and injunctive
norms, referring to what others think one ought to do. Although the above-
4See, e.g., Dwenger et al. (2016) where 20% of individuals pay their church taxes owed
in absence of any deterrence or even third-party reporting, and the “slippery slope” frame-
work, introduced by Kirchler et al. (2008) where both voluntary and enforced compliance
are found to be important.
5See, e.g., Gordon (1989) and Erard and Feinstein (1994) for early contributions and
Luttmer and Singhal (2014) for a recent and comprehensive survey.
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mentioned (and other) studies often have analyzed the descriptive norms in
models of tax evasion, Jacobson et al. (2011) find that injunctive norms are
the ones that mainly invoke social obligations. Bobek et al. (2007) study
tax compliance and explore the various norm concepts in Cialdini and Trost
(1998). They find that the personal norm is the most important, followed by
the injunctive, while descriptive norms did not explain tax compliance at all.
These kinds of injunctive social norms in combination with personal intrinsic
norms explain compliance and noncompliance behavior in the present paper.
3 Theories of norm evolution
Norms concerning, e.g., tax morale may not be constant, but may evolve over
time. Theories concerning such norm evolution have mainly been proposed
within social psychology (for a comprehensive overview, see Turner, 1991).
Personal norms may change due to one’s own past behavior, others’ behavior,
others’ attitudes, or some combination of these.
Nordblom and Zˇamac (2012) present some theories in more detail and
their results indicate that self-signaling (or cognitive dissonance) and nor-
mative conformity may be important in explaining how personal attitudes
toward buying black-market services evolve over time.
According to the self-signaling theory (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2004, 2006,
2011a), individuals are unaware of their personal norms before they act. Once
they act, their action reveals what type they are, e.g., evader or non-evader,
and personal norms are updated accordingly. Hence, behavior in one period
affects the intrinsic norm in the next.
In an experimental taxation setting, Wenzel (2005b) finds evidence, not
only of tax morale influencing compliance, but also that tax compliance has a
causal effect on personal tax morale, such that evasion in one period reduces
tax morale in the next. Although, not in a tax related situation, Lieberman
et al. (2001) find behavior to cause an automatic change in personal attitudes.
Norms may also change through social interaction and the influence of
others’ attitudes. According to the theory of normative conformity, one con-
forms to what others view as right (Deutch and Gerard, 1955). Hence, indi-
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viduals’ intrinsic norms may over time conform to injunctive group norms.
In his seminal paper, Bernheim (1994) finds that when status is sufficiently
valued one may conform to the social norm although it may go against one’s
own intrinsic motivation. According to Michaeli and Spiro (2015), the inner
discomfort due to cognitive dissonance and social pressure could be reduced
by conforming to the average stance. In liberal societies, the further one’s
own norm is from the social one, the more one is likely to compromise and
change one’s own view over time.
Hence, there are many indications that others’ opinions, as well as one’s
own previous compliance or noncompliance, affect personal tax morale. There-
fore policies that affect compliance behavior could also affect tax morale,
which creates an even stronger long-term effect on behavior. Nordblom and
Zˇamac (2012) argue that the two above-mentioned mechanisms are important
in explaining how personal tax morale may evolve over time: First, according
to normative conformity, personal and social norms are interlinked. One is
influenced by what others think is the right thing and tend to conform to that
view. Second, people may update their personal tax morale as a consequence
of their own past behavior, due to self-signaling.6 Besley et al. (2015) extend
the model by Be´nabou and Tirole (2011b) in the tax-evasion context and use
both intrinsic motivation and concern with one’s own reputation based on
social norms to explain behavior. They find that the increase in evasion due
to the UK poll tax of 1990 prevailed even after the tax was abolished because
of a weakened social norm of compliance. Kim (2003) models tax evasion in
a dynamic setting with social interactions and concludes that a tax reform
may shift social norms significantly. Also Traxler (2010) studies a tax reform
and how it affects evasion behavior and thereby the overall social norm of
evasion. In his example, a tax increase implies more evaders both due to
the substitution effect and to the norm effect. Most recently, Lamantia and
Pezzino (2017) study social interactions and the long-run evolution of tax-
compliance norms. Common in all these papers is that social norms evolve
over time and multiple equilibria may exist depending on initial conditions.
6In Nordblom and Zˇamac (2012), both these mechanisms are supported by Swedish
data comparing different generations’ tax morale.
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The premise in the present paper is similar: The way in which norms evolve
gives rise to multiple equilibria. Moreover, a policy change will alter compli-
ance both directly and via a second-order effect on the social norm, which
amplifies the effect.
4 A theory of buying black-market services
This section shows how choices and social norms concerning black-market
services evolve over time. We will first look at the individual’s atemporal
choice in 4.1 and aggregate it to the population consisting of heterogenous
individuals in 4.2 before turning to how norms evolve over time in 4.3 and
4.4.
4.1 The individual’s choice
In a simple partial equilibrium model, at any point in time, individual i has
a certain income, Yi, which is spent on goods consumption, ci, and possibly
on a household service, S, of a fixed amount. The service could be bought on
the white market, SW , or on the black market, SB, and the two are perfect
substitutes in terms of result. pW > pB > 0 are the prices of white- and
black-market services, respectively.7
Buying from the black-market sector thus leaves more resources for goods
consumption than buying in the white-market sector due to the tax wedge.8
Let us assume that saving is not possible. This means that the choice in any
point in time can be analyzed independently from previous and following
7It is a simplification to assume that there is just one price when buying the
black-market service. We could think of pB as not only reflecting the actual price
paid, but also incorporating fines and the risk of detection. The risky aspects of
black-market services are not the issue of this paper, so this simplification is innocu-
ous. Moreover, Blaufus et al. (2016) find that the mere legality may be important to
people’s actions also when there are no penalties for evasion. For this type of crime,
penalties are usually quite low. For example, in a folder from Swedish Economic
Crime Authority trying to persuade people not to buy black-market services, no ref-
erence at all is made to penalties, just to the illegality and the consequences for society. See
https://www.ekobrottsmyndigheten.se/PageFiles/195/EBM infofolder hushallsnara tjanster.pdf
8We abstain from any supply-side effects, but assume that both black and white markets
are characterized by perfect competition, so that buyers are price takers.
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periods. Hence, although the individual lives for a large number of periods,
she only has one discrete choice in every period in time, k ∈ K, where
K = {N,B,W}, meaning the individual chooses not to buy S (N), to buy
S from the black market (B) or to buy S from the white market (W ).9
Utility from goods and service consumption, u(c, S) is a positive function,
where marginal utility of c ∈ (0, Yi] is decreasing.
u(ck, Sk) = {u(Yi, 0);u(Yi − pB, S);u(Yi − pW , S)}, k = N,B,W (1)
Hence, if nothing but pecuniary interests are taken into account, the
individual would not choose W . However, there may be a psychological
disutility from buying a black-market service. People have an intrinsic moral
attitude toward buying black-market services, γi ∈ [0, 1]. If γi = 0, one
has no moral doubts about buying black-market services. If γi = 1, one is
extremely reluctant to do so.
Individuals are part of social networks and are concerned with the atti-
tudes of their peers. If people talk freely, the average moral attitude, γ¯, i.e.,
the social norm, is known to the individual and may affect disutility from
noncompliance. If one buys the black-market service, one experiences disu-
tility if peers disapprove, and the more unacceptable it is ( the higher γ¯) the
larger the disutility.10 The individual is concerned with conforming to what
others think is the right thing to do, not necessarily how they act.
Thus both an intrinsic personal norm and a social norm affect the utility
of buying the service from the black market. These two effects are joined
in the positive and convex function ϕ(.) reflecting the degree of disutility or
guilt that the individual experiences if she buys the black-market service:
ϕBi = ϕ
(
γi, γ¯,
)
, (2)
where {γi, γ¯} ∈ [0, 1]→ ϕ ∈ [0,∞). ϕki = 0 ∀ k 6= B.
Hence, the total utility of the individual could be written
9Since SW and SB are perfect substitutes, no one would buy both kinds of services.
10c.f., the injunctive norm that was discussed in Section 2.
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U∗i = max
k∈K
U(ck, Sk, ϕ
k) (3)
where K = {N,B,W}. Hence,
U∗i = max
{
u(Yi, 0); u(Yi − pB, S)− ϕ(γi, γ¯); u(Yi − pW , S)
}
. (4)
Depending on Yi and γi, the individual will choose k ∈ K and end up in
one of the three domains in Figure 1 according to (5).
Figure 1: Combinations of Y and ϕ that make individuals end up in different
domains
W
N
B
Y2
Y1
j
BW
j
BN
Income
j
k =

N if N  W and N  B
B if B  W and B  N
W if W  N and W  B
(5)
The threshold incomes in Figure 1 are Y1 : u(Y1, 0) = u(Y1 − pB, S), i.e.,
the income below which no service is bought and Y2 : u(Y2, 0) = u(Y2−pW , S),
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i.e., the income above which a service is bought, either on the black or on
the white market.
The individual’s choice thus depends on Yi and ϕi as illustrated in Figure
1, in a way which can be described as
Yi ≤ Y1 ⇒ k = N
Yi ∈ (Y1, Y2) ⇒ k =
{
N if ϕi ≥ ϕBN(Yi)
B if ϕi < ϕ
BN(Yi)
(6)
Yi ≥ Y2 ⇒ k =
{
W if ϕi ≥ ϕBW (Yi)
B if ϕi < ϕ
BW (Yi)
where the threshold values of ϕ as a function of Y , ϕBN and ϕBW are defined
in equations (9) and (10) below.
4.1.1 Describing the thresholds
In order to end up in region B in Figure 1, i must strictly prefer B to both
N and W :
B  N ⇔ ϕi < u(Yi − pB, S)− u(Yi, 0) (7)
B  W ⇔ ϕi < u(Yi − pB, S)− u(Yi − pW , S) (8)
The threshold values of ϕ below which an individual chooses k = B thus
become functions of Yi. ϕ
BN(Yi) : B  N for ϕi < ϕBN(Yi) from (7) is
increasing and concave in Yi:
ϕBN(Yi) = u(Yi − pB, S)− u(Yi, 0). (9)
For given prices a unique ϕBN exists for every Y so that those with
lower ϕ choose B and those with weakly higher ϕ choose N . When income
increases, the constraint on ϕi required for preferring B to N is loosened.
ϕBW (Yi) : B  W for ϕi < ϕBW (Yi) is instead decreasing and convex in Yi:
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ϕBW (Yi) = u(Yi − pB, S)− u(Yi − pW , S). (10)
For given prices a unique ϕBW exists for every Y so that those with lower
ϕ choose B and those with weakly higher ϕ choose W . The higher Yi is, the
lower ϕi an individual requires to prefer B to W .
The choice between W and N is independent of ϕi, but with an income
above Y2, W  N :
W  N ⇔ u(Yi, 0) ≤ u(Yi − pW , S) (11)
The individual’s choice thus depends on Yi and ϕi as described above
and summarized in Figure 1 and (6). In the model by Gordon (1989) (and
many others to follow11), there is a threshold value of the psychic cost which
divides people into evaders and non-evaders. In the present model, there is
instead a threshold function of income.
4.2 From individual to population
The population has unit mass and consists of individuals who all have the
same utility function (as described above), but differ in terms of income and
moral attitudes. When both Yi and γi follow some distributions, different
people make different choices according to (6). F (ϕ) =
∫∞
ϕ=0
f(ϕ)dϕ is the
cumulative distribution function of combinations of individual and social
norms.12 F (Y ) =
∫∞
Y=0
f(Y )dY is the cumulative distribution function of
incomes.
The shares choosing each of the options at any point in time could be
defined as follows. The share β who chooses k = B can be expressed as
11See e.g., Kim (2003) and Besley et al. (2015),
12Note that ϕi = ϕ(γi, γ¯) = ϕ(γi, γ¯(F (γ))). Hence F (ϕ) = ζ(F (γ)) where ζ(.) is a pos-
itive monotone transformation. The distribution of γ thus translates into the distribution
of ϕ.
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β =
∫ Y2
Y=Y1
(∫ ϕBN (Y )
ϕ=0
f(ϕ)dϕ
)
f(Y )dY +
∫ ∞
Y=Y2
(∫ ϕBW (Y )
ϕ=0
f(ϕ)dϕ
)
f(Y )dY
(12)
and the share δ who chooses k = W as
δ =
∫ ∞
Y=Y2
(∫ ∞
ϕ=ϕBW (Y )
f(ϕ)dϕ
)
f(Y )dY. (13)
The share who chooses k = N is η = 1− β− δ, which could be expressed
as
η =
∫ Y1
Y=0
f(Y )dY +
∫ Y2
Y=Y1
(∫ ∞
ϕ=ϕBN (Y )
f(ϕ)dϕ
)
f(Y )dY. (14)
Hence, the distributions F (Y ) and F (ϕ) determine the three shares. For
a given F (Y ), the lower the distribution of γi (and γ¯), the larger the share
β and the smaller δ. The share choosing B is larger among middle-income
earners than among those with very high or low incomes. Low-income earners
cannot afford any service at all, and among high-income earners a larger part
buy S from the white market.
4.3 Updating norms
Above, we saw that the individuals’ choices at any point in time depend
on income as well as on intrinsic and social norms. In the intertemporal
perspective, Yi and F (Y ) are assumed to be constant over time, whereas
F (ϕ) may change if γi and/or γ¯ is altered.
According to the updating mechanism of self-signaling, proposed by Be´nabou
and Tirole (2004, 2006, 2011a), behavior indicates (even to oneself) whether
one is an evader or a non-evader. Hence, if one bought a black-market ser-
vice in period t − 1, one wants to justify that behavior13 and becomes less
reluctant to buying black-market services in t (γi is reduced in accordance
with some parameter αb > 0). Likewise, if one bought on the white market,
one signals that one is not an evader and one’s reluctance toward buying on
13Just as in the theory of cognitive dissonance.
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the black market increases (γi increases in accordance with some αw > 0).
Hence, behavior in one period affects the value of γi in the next.
Also normative conformity with social norms may induce updated norms.
An individual with a γi < (>)γ¯ would increase (decrease) their γi to conform
to the views of their peers.
When updating the personal norm, both self-signaling and normative
conformity play a role.14 However, if the individual does not buy any services
at all, only the conformity mechanism matters.
Hence, personal norms are updated according to
γit =

γit−1 + γit−1(1− γit−1)
[
µf(γ¯t−1 − γit−1) + (1− µ)αw
]
if kit−1 = W
γit−1 + γit−1(1− γit−1)
[
µf(γ¯t−1 − γit−1)− (1− µ)αb
]
if kit−1 = B
γit−1 + γit−1(1− γit−1)µf(γ¯t−1 − γit−1) if kit−1 = N
(15)
where µ ∈ (0, 1) determines the importance of conformity for the updating
process, relative to one’s own behavior, which affects the personal norm by
αw ∈ (0, 1) or αb ∈ (0, 1). f is the continuous and strictly positive function,
with f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1 associated with conformity. The updating terms
are multiplied by γit−1(1 − γit−1), which is the propensity to adjust. The
closer γit−1 is to the extreme values, the less likely one is to alter one’s norm,
and once γi = {0, 1}, one does not change the norm at all. The formulations
in (15) assure that γi ∈ [0, 1].
In period t, all individuals in the economy update their norms according
to (15), depending on their actions and on the social norm in t−1. The social
norm γ¯ ∈ [0, 1], which is the average of individual norms, will be updated
then too:
γ¯t = γ¯t−1 +
∑
i
(γit − γit−1), (16)
where the differences (γit−γit−1) are given by (15), depending on the actions
14See Nordblom and Zˇamac (2012) for a more comprehensive description of the two
updating mechanisms.
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of the individuals.
In each period t, a fraction ρ enters the economy and a share κ leaves it.
Those who leave have on average γi = γ¯t−1 and those who enter get a γit ∈
(0, 1) drawn from a Poisson distribution, where on average γ¯ρt = γ¯t−1.15 In
the following we therefore do not have to explicitly take changed population
composition into account.
When γi is updated according to (15) ∀ i, and thereby γ¯ according to
(16), the distribution F (ϕ) will change. This may cause some individuals to
alter their behavior depending on the inequalities in (7) and (8). Hence, the
shares δ, β and η may evolve over time.
Individual norms, as well as the social norm, may thus evolve over time
due to both behavior and social interactions, resulting in both altered be-
havior and norms over time.
4.4 Multiple equilibria
In equilibrium γit = γit−1 ∀i ⇒ γ¯t = γ¯t−1 must hold. Also δt = δt−1,
βt = βt−1 and ηt = ηt−1 in equilibrium. According to (15) and (16), γit ∈ [0, 1]
and γ¯t ∈ [0, 1] are continuous functions of γit−1 ∈ [0, 1] and γ¯t−1 ∈ [0, 1],
respectively. Hence, regarding both each individual and the social norm,
there exists at least one fixed point in the interval, indicating equilibrium.
The present model will actually generate two stable potential equilibria and
one unstable equilibrium in between.16 The equilibria are sketched in Figure
15As long as γ¯ ∈ (0, 1), the initial γ’s for individuals entering the model follow a Poisson
distribution with λ = min{γ¯t−1, 1− γ¯t−1} such that
f(γ) =
{
eλλγ
γ! if γ¯t−1 ≤ 1/2
1− eλλγγ! if γ¯t−1 > 1/2.
(17)
This assures that the updating of γ¯t is unaffected by individuals leaving and entering
the economy. The closer to the extremes (0 and 1) the social norm γ¯t−1 is, the more
concentrated around this norm the new entrants will be. If γ¯ = {0, 1}, the economy will
be in a stable equilibrium, and all new entrants will get γi = γ¯.
16The existence of multiple equilibria is similar to what previous literature on endoge-
nous norm formation has pointed out. Lindbeck et al. (2003) state that ”endogenous norms
may generate multiple equilibria in economic decisions” and Kim (2003) shows that in his
model there are (at least) three equilibria, of which two are stable. In Myles and Naylor
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2, which shows that the two stable equilibria imply extreme-value preferences.
Let us now analyze what constitutes these equilibria by studying the different
groups in the economy separately.
For an individual who chooses k = W , the following must hold in equi-
librium:
γWit = γ
W
it−1+γ
W
it−1(1−γWit−1)
[
µf(γ¯t−1−γWit−1)+(1−µ)αw
]
= γWit−1 = γ
W
i . (18)
There are three options that solve (18): Either γWi ∈ {0, 1}, or γWi ∈ (0, 1]
such that
γWi = γ¯ + g
[
(1− µ)αw
µ
]
(19)
where g[·] = f−1(·), i.e., a continuous, positive and increasing function. As
the right-hand side of (19) consists of constants that everyone in the economy
shares, γWi = γ
W∗ ∀ {i : ki = W} must hold in equilibrium.
Obviously, γW∗ ≥ γ¯. Because both γW∗ and γ¯ are bounded above γW∗ =
γ¯ ⇔ γ¯ = 1.
Hence, the share δ has two possibilities in equilibrium: Either γW∗ = 1
or γW∗ ∈ (0, 1), determined in (19) ∀ {i : ki = W}.17 In the interior
equilibrium, those who choose k = W have a higher than average γ, so they
tend to conform their γi, but this reduction is exactly offset by the increase
due to buying the white-market service.
For those individuals where k = B, the equilibrium norm (common to
everyone in β) is determined by
γBit = γ
B
it−1+
(
γBt−1(1−γBt−1)
)[
µf(γ¯t−1−γBit−1)−(1−µ)αb
]
= γBit−1 = γ
B∗ (20)
(1996), one equilibrium where everyone evades and another one where no one evades are
both possible. Also in Traxler (2010), there are two stable equilibria (with almost no-one
and almost everyone evading, respectively) and one unstable in between.
17Footnote 20 shows that γW∗ = 0 is not possible in equilibrium if δ > 0.
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One possible solution is the corner solution γB∗ = 0.18 However, if γB∗ ∈
(0, 1) ∀ {i : ki = B}, the bracketed expression has to be zero, i.e.:
γB∗ = γ¯ − g
[
(1− µ)αb
µ
]
. (21)
Hence, γB∗ ≤ γ¯ and γ¯ = 0⇔ γ¯ = γB∗.
For the share η = 1− δ − β where k = N
γNit = γ
N
it−1 + γ
N
it−1(1− γNit−1)µf(γ¯t−1 − γNit−1) = γNit−1. (22)
This requires that γNit = γ¯ = γ
N∗.19
For the total social norm, thus
γ¯∗ = δγW∗ + βγB∗ + ηγN∗ =
δγW∗ + βγB∗
δ + β
. (23)
Proposition 1. There are three potential equilibria for the social norm –
two are stable where γ¯∗ ∈ {0, 1}. There is also an unstable equilibrium where
γ¯∗ ∈ (0, 1). The potential equilibria are sketched in Figure 2 and characterized
by
γ¯∗ = 0 δ = 0 β > 0 Stable
γ¯∗ = 1 δ > 0 β = 0 Stable
γ¯∗ ∈ (0, 1) δ > 0 β > 0 Unstable.
(24)
Proof. If no one buys from the white market, i.e., δ = 0, then (23) implies
that γ¯∗ = γB∗. Above we concluded that this is equivalent to γ¯∗ = 0. Hence,
iff δ = 0 in equilibrium, γ¯∗ = 0. Since no one will then alter their γi, the
equilibrium is stable. Likewise, iff β = 0, there is a stable equilibrium where
γ¯∗ = 1. An unstable equilibrium γ¯∗ ∈ (0, 1) exists where both δ > 0 and
18It can be shown that γB∗ = 1 is not an attainable equilibrium when β > 0
19For γNit ∈ (0, 1), this is self-evident. (22) would be fulfilled also for γN ∈ {0, 1}.
However, since initial γ’s follow a distribution with mean γ¯ and the group η update their
γ’s only with respect to γ¯, the group would not reach the equilibria γN ∈ {0, 1} unless
γ¯ ∈ {0, 1}.
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β > 0. The share δ hold γi = γ
W∗ ∈ (0, 1], as determined in (19).20 The
share β hold γi = γ
B∗ ∈ [0, 1), as determined in (21). There is also a fraction
η who choose k = N and who have γi = γ¯∗ ∈ (γB∗, γW∗) in equilibrium.
Substituting (19) and (21) into (23), we get
γ¯∗ = γ¯∗ + δg
[
(1− µ)αw
µ
]
− βg
[
(1− µ)αb
µ
]
. (25)
For (25) to hold, thus δg
[
(1−µ)αw
µ
]
= βg
[
(1−µ)αb
µ
]
is required. This unsta-
ble equilibrium also marks the boundary for the paths toward the two stable
equilibria.21 22
Figure 2 sketches the three potential equilibria and the trajectories toward
them.
Corollary 1. At the outset, an economy where people differ in their atti-
tudes,23 could be characterized as either of the three:
1. Constant γ¯ in an unstable equilibrium where δg
[
(1−µ)αw
µ
]
= βg
[
(1−µ)αb
µ
]
.
2. A positive trajectory γ¯ → 1, β → 0 ; δg
[
(1−µ)αw
µ
]
> βg
[
(1−µ)αb
µ
]
.
3. A negative trajectory γ¯ → 0, δ → 0 ; δg
[
(1−µ)αw
µ
]
< βg
[
(1−µ)αb
µ
]
.
20Assume δ > 0 and γW∗ = 0. Then the total, γ¯∗ = δ0 + βγB∗ + (1 − β − δ)γ¯∗ ⇒
γ¯∗(β + δ) = βγB∗ ⇒ γB∗ > γ¯∗. According to (21) this requires that γ¯∗ < 0, which is not
attainable.
21The mechanisms are the same also in the equilibria where at least one of the groups
is in a corner solution, i.e., when γW∗ = 1 and/or γB∗ = 0. Also these equilibria are
unstable in the sense that γ¯ will change if the system is shocked, since γN∗ = γ¯ ∈ (0, 1).
22As soon as δg
[
(1−µ)αw
µ
]
> βg
[
(1−µ)αb
µ
]
, γ¯ begins to increase over time, and this will
continue until the stable equilibrium γ∗i = γ¯
∗ = 1 ∀ i ⇒ ϕi = ∞ ∀ i is reached. In
such equilibrium, β = 0, since u(Yi − pB , S)− u(Yi − pW , S) <∞ ∀ Yi according to (10).
On the other hand, if g
[
(1−µ)αw
µ
]
< g
[
(1−µ)αb
µ
]
, γ¯ will instead decrease over time until
γ∗i = γ¯
∗ = 0 ∀i ⇒ ϕi = 0 ∀i, which is the second stable equilibrium. In such equilibrium,
δ = 0, since u(Yi − pB , S)− u(Yi − pW , S) > 0 ∀ Yi according to (10).
23This rules out having reached either of the two stable equilibria.
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Figure 2: The three potential equilibria
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5 Policy intervention
Kim (2003) points out that the existence of multiple equilibria is important
for the effects from policy intervention, since an economy stuck in a “bad”
equilibrium could actually be put on a path toward a “good” equilibrium
with the right policy tools. If people’s choices affect their moral attitudes and
those of others, policy interventions that affect choices should also influence
the development of attitudes. Let us analyze how a policy that subsidizes
white-market services affects behavior and norms.
Consider an economy outside equilibrium or in the unstable equilibrium.
By increasing the share δ, also the social norm can be strengthened. Assume
that the government introduces a subsidy for white-market services in period
t = 1, so that the new price pˆW ∈ [pB, pW ). Then more people will choose
17
W and fewer will choose B than in t = 0 c.p.24
How many will change behavior depends on the size of the subsidy and
the distribution of the γ’s at the time of the policy implementation. Figure 3
shows how the domains change when pˆW ∈ (pB, pW ). The threshold income
above which the service certainly will be bought is lowered from Y2 to Yˆ .
Above this income, the threshold norm above which W is chosen is reduced
from ϕBW to ϕ
ˆBW . Appendix A shows exactly how the shares δ, β and η
change.
Figure 3: How the different domains change when pW is reduced
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B
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j
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j
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5.1 Norm development after reform
We cannot generally say how γ¯1 and γ¯0 relate to each other, although we
know that δ1 > δ0 and β1 < β0. We know, though, that
Proposition 2. Outside the stable extreme-value equilibria, γ¯ will grow steadily
∀ t > 1 if the subsidy is sufficiently large:
24Incomes and prices remain constant. Hence, we disregard any supply-side effects.
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Proof. i) If the social norm at the outset was either at the unstable equi-
librium or on a positive trajectory (i.e., δ0g
[
(1−µ)αw
µ
]
≥ β0g
[
(1−µ)αb
µ
]
),
it follows directly from Corollary 1 that the social norm will be on a
positive trajectory toward γ = 1, irrespective of the size of the subsidy.
ii) If γ¯ from the outset was on a negative trajectory (i.e., δ0g
[
(1−µ)αw
µ
]
<
β0g
[
(1−µ)αb
µ
]
), it will, after the reform, be on a positive trajectory iff pWˆ
is low enough to give sufficiently low Yˆ and ϕBWˆ so that δ1g
[
(1−µ)αw
µ
]
≥
β1g
[
(1−µ)αb
µ
]
. Then γ¯2 > γ¯1 although γ¯1 < γ¯0, and onward γ¯ will
continue to increase, as will δ, while β diminishes as the social norm
against black-market services approaches γ¯ = 1.
Corollary 2. According to Proposition 2, the social norm will steadily in-
crease after introducing the sufficiently large subsidy. This, in turn, implies
that the distribution of ϕ is continuously pushed upwards, i.e,
∫ X
ϕ=0
f(ϕt)dϕ <
∫ X
ϕ=0
f(ϕt−1)dϕ (26)∫ ∞
ϕ=X
f(ϕt)dϕ >
∫ ∞
ϕ=X
f(ϕt−1)dϕ (27)
∀ t > 1 where X is an arbitrary number, X ∈ (0,∞).
After the introduction of the subsidy, the social norm will thus be on
a positive trajectory: a larger and larger share will choose k = W and a
smaller and smaller share will choose k = B. The longer the subsidy is at
work, the closer the economy will come to the good equilibrium where γ¯ = 1
and β = 0.
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5.2 Abolished subsidy
The subsidy is costly, but under some circumstances it can actually be abol-
ished after a while without the risk of returning to a large black market,
although the abolition implies an immediate drop in δ, which corresponds
to increases in β and η.25 If the subsidy has been in place for a sufficient
time so that the social norm has moved sufficiently far along the positive
trajectory, abolishing the subsidy will imply that γ¯ will continue to increase,
although at a slower pace. If, on the other hand, the subsidy has not been in
place for a sufficiently long time, the social norm will return to the negative
trajectory.
Assume that the economy is on a negative trajectory before the subsidy
is introduced, i.e., δ0g
[
(1−µ)αw
µ
]
< β0g
[
(1−µ)αb
µ
]
. According to Proposition
2 ii), γ¯ is put on a positive trajectory after a sufficiently large subsidy is
introduced in t = 1. According to Corollary 2, the distribution F (ϕ) is then
continuously pushed upward ∀ t > 1. Hence, δ will steadily increase and β
will steadily decrease as long as the subsidy is in place, i.e., until t = T − 1.
Iff δTg
[
(1−µ)αw
µ
]
≥ βTg
[
(1−µ)αb
µ
]
, γ¯ will continue to increase even after the
subsidy is abolished in T .26
Since Corollary 2 gives us that F (ϕ)t is continuously pushed upward also
for t > T , (12) implies that the share β will continue to decrease even after
the subsidy is abolished. Hence, in line with the reasoning of Kim (2003), the
multiplicity of equilibria of the model brings us to the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If the subsidy has been in place sufficiently long and has
been sufficiently large, the social norm γ¯ remains on a positive trajectory and
the share choosing B continues to decrease even after the subsidy has been
abolished.
25See Appendix B for the calculations.
26See Corollary 1.
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5.3 Comparing two policies that eliminate the black
market
Subsidizing the white-market services has been done in several countries dur-
ing the last decades,27 but it comes at a cost. An alternative, which may
seem more cost-effective, is to strengthen enforcement. Let us compare the
two policies in terms of what they do to the long-run social norm, given that
both have the immediate effect of completely eliminating the black market.
Consider a subsidy from period t = 1, which is sufficiently large to yield
pˆW = pB, so that everyone who buys the service chooses W and none B,
i.e., Yˆ = Y1 ⇒ βt = 0 ∀ t > 0. Hence, the share for whom W  N is
δˆ =
∫∞
Y1
f(Y )dY .
An alternative to decreasing pW would be to increase pB to p˜B, by e.g.,
higher fines or more frequent audits. If p˜B = pW from period t = 1 and
onward, no one would buy S from the black market anymore. The share for
whom W  N would be δ˜ = ∫∞
Y2
f(Y )dY .
Proposition 4. A subsidy of W eliminating B gives rise to a faster norm
increase than increased enforcement that also eliminates B.
Proof. At any point t > 0 after any of the reforms, the social norm
γ¯t = γ¯0 + δtg
[
(1− µ)αw
µ
]
, (28)
since β = 0. With a subsidy, δˆ =
∫∞
Y1
f(Y )dY , and with increased enforce-
ment, δ˜ =
∫∞
Y2
f(Y )dY . Hence, δˆ > δ˜ implying that ˆ¯γt > ˜¯γt ∀t > 0.
Hence, the long-run social norm will grow faster if the black market is
eliminated by the use of a subsidy than it will by increased enforcement.
Although increased enforcement may seem superior in the short run (the
same immediate effect at a lower cost), the long-run willingness to comply
would be better fostered by the subsidy.
27E.g., France, Belgium, Finland and Sweden.
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6 Evidence
A policy intervention very much in line with the one described in Section 5
has recently been introduced in Sweden and observations from there can be
used to illustrate the model.
Starting in July 2007 the labor cost of household services was reduced by
half for buyers, and in December 2008 the same subsidy was introduced for
construction work at one’s own home. In terms of the model presented in
Section 5, pˆW was set very low. Anecdotal evidence also suggest that almost
all black-market jobs disappeared in the household service and construction
sectors and many legal cleaning businesses started, which suggests that peo-
ple actually changed their behavior and started to buy the services from the
white market and left the black market.
As of January 2016, the subsidies have been substantially reduced. The
maximum amount subsidized for household services was reduced by half, and
for construction work, only 30% of the labor cost is now reimbursed.
According to the presented theory, this subsidy would have had an impact
on people’s attitudes, increasing γ. This increase would continue after the
reduction if the subsidy was large enough.
In 2006, the Swedish tax agency conducted a survey regarding buying
black-market services among a sample of the Swedish population, and 2,312
individuals responded to it. As is common, the response rate was higher
among women, the elderly and people with a higher education. Therefore,
the numbers presented in Table 1 and Figure ?? below are weighted values.
One question was the following:
Do you agree or not with the statement: It is immoral to buy
black-market services.
The respondents could answer on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 meant Do
not agree at all and 7 meant Agree completely.
The distribution of the answers is shown by the black bars in Figure
4.28 In October 2012, the same question was posed for a report on Swedish
28The scale is comprised to five steps.
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taxes29 in order to see whether the attitudes had actually changed four to
five years after the introduction of the subsidy. That interview was also
conducted by telephone, and the sample includes 992 usable respondents.
The weighted distribution of these answers is shown by the light gray bars in
Figure 4. A third wave of data was gathered during spring 2017 in order to
see whether the norm continued to increase or whether it had deteriorated as
a consequence of reduced subsidies from 2016. From this telephone interview
of a random sample of Swedes, there are answers from 998 individuals. The
weighted distribution of these answers is presented by the dark gray bars in
Figure 4.
The three samples are different, i.e., I do not have a panel consisting of
the same individuals at different points in time. Therefore, we cannot analyze
what effects the policy reform has had on the individual tax morale. How-
ever, the samples are sufficiently large and representative that they enable a
comparison of what has happened with the aggregate norm.
Figure 4: Distribution of answers to the statement “It is immoral to buy
black-market services” (percent)
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29Flood et al. (2013).
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Table 1: Distribution of answers to the statement “It is immoral to buy
black-market services” (percent)
2006 2012 2017
1 12 10 5
2 20 8 5
3 27 16 16
4 24 19 22
5 17 47 52
Mean value 3.1 3.8 4.1
No. of obs. 2,153 969 998
Note. 1 means “Do not agree at all” and 5 means “Agree completely.”
The figure shows a dramatic increase in the share who completely agrees
with the statement “It is immoral to buy black-market services,” from 17
percent in 2006 to 47 percent in late 2012. Needless to say, the two distribu-
tions are significantly different from each other according to a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (p=0.000). Also 17 months after the reductions in the subsidies,
the stronger social norm prevails. The share who completely agrees with the
statement had even increased to 52 percent in 2017. However, the difference
between 2012 and 2017 is not statistically significant.
According to the model in Section 5, the average norm would increase
after a policy intervention that reduces pˆW sufficiently. Table 1 presents also
the average answers, or γ¯ for the three points in time. In 2006 the average
norm was not to bother at all about the question of buying black-market
services, in other words neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the statement
“It is immoral to buy black-market services.” In 2012, however, the average
norm had increased to somewhat agreeing with the statement, an increase
which is significant according to a t-test (p=0.000). Also the difference in
means between 2012 and 2017 is significant (p=0.003). Although the data are
repeated cross section and not panel data so that one cannot prove causality,
the nonparametric results are in line with the proposed theory. When the
subsidy is introduced, the social norm increases and when it has increased
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Table 2: The average answers to the statement “It is immoral to buy black-
market services”
Group γ
Only black 3.5
Both black and white 3.8
Only white 4.4
Never bought services 4.2
No. of obs. 975
Note. 1 means “Do not agree at all” and 5 means “Agree completely.”
sufficiently, it will continue to do so even if the subsidy is substantially re-
duced.
In the last wave of data collection, respondents were also asked about their
experience of buying services and we can see how the answers differ in light
of their own experience. There are four groups: those who have only bought
black-market services, those who have only bought white-market services,
those who have bought from both markets and those who have not bought
any services at all. Table 2 presents the average γ’s in each group.
According to Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests, the two groups with expe-
rience of buying black-market services are different at the 5 percent level as
are the two groups without such experience. The other pairs of groups are
significantly different (p = 0.000). Hence, also these results corroborate the
proposed theory: Those with the least reluctance to buying black-market
services still buy them when white-market services are heavily subsidized,
and those who buy from the white market without previously having turned
to the black market are the ones who are the most reluctant to buy from the
black market.
7 Conclusions
This paper has shown that an inevitable path leading toward more and more
tax evasion and weaker and weaker tax morale can indeed be averted by
means other than increased enforcement. A model of endogenous norm for-
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mation based on social interaction enables policies to affect norms as well as
behavior.
The model explains how preferences may evolve over time due to one’s
own behavior and social interactions. When people decide whether or not to
buy black-market services, both their own tax morale and the social norm
influence the decision. The analysis is dynamic, hence, actions in one period
may affect attitudes in the next. Someone who evades tends to justify it
by becoming more tolerant of evasion. Someone who instead pays the extra
cost of complying wants that action to pay off and therefore tends to become
more intolerant to evasion. People also influence each other. One tends
to conform somewhat to what peers think is the right thing to do. Hence,
individual norms may change over time due to both one’s own actions and
others’ opinions.
The dynamic nature of the model gives rise to three potential equilibria,
of which two are stable: one where no one buys black-market services and
where everyone shares the strongest possible norm of compliance, and one
where this norm is completely deteriorated and no one therefore buys services
from the white market. If the economy is stuck on a trajectory toward
the latter, this paper has shown that an adequate temporary policy change
may permanently turn the economy to a trajectory toward the compliant
equilibrium. If a subsidy of white-market services (like the recent Swedish
reform) is introduced, more people will buy from the white market and fewer
from the black market. This will first strengthen tax morale among buyers,
who want to feel good about themselves, and through normative conformity
this strengthens the overall social norm, which in the next period will induce
even more individuals to switch from black to white services and so on. This
is good news, as it is possible to break a vicious circle of increasing evasion
by stimulating compliance.
Evidence from Sweden supports the theory and shows a drastically strength-
ened norm of reluctance to using black-market services during the last decade
while a subsidy of white-market services has been in place.
The proposed model indicates that subsidizing white-market services is
actually better at fostering the long-run willingness to comply than increased
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enforcement is. Also previous research has questioned the effects of increased
enforcement. Taxpayers may tend to reciprocate tax policy and thereby evade
more instead of less if audits and fines are increased (Feld and Frey, 2002;
Mendoza et al., 2017).
In this paper, any supply-side effects have been completely ignored. How-
ever, it is likely that altered social norms concerning buying black-market
services also spill over to selling such services. Hence, the social norm may
well affect both demand and supply in the same direction. The trajectory
toward the compliant equilibrium would then move even faster.
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A Appendix: Altered behavior after the in-
troduction of the subsidy
After the policy change, the choices in different income intervals could be summa-
rized as follows:
Yi ≤ Y1 ⇒ k = N
Yi ∈ (Y1, Yˆ ) ⇒ k =
{
N if ϕi ≥ ϕBN (Yi)
B if ϕi < ϕ
BN (Yi)
(29)
Yi ≥ Yˆ ⇒ k =
{
W if ϕi ≥ ϕBWˆ (Yi)
B if ϕi < ϕ
BWˆ (Yi).
When the subsidy is introduced in t = 1, the share δ increases, while β and η
decrease:
β1 =
∫ Yˆ
Y=Y1
(∫ ϕBN (Y )
ϕ=0
f(ϕ)dϕ
)
f(Y )dY +
∫ ∞
Y=Yˆ
(∫ ϕBWˆ (Y )
ϕ=0
f(ϕ)dϕ
)
f(Y )dY.
(30)
Compare this to β0 determined in (12):
β0 − β1 = (31)∫ Yˆ
Y1
∫ ϕBN
0
f(ϕ)dϕf(Y )dY +
∫ Y2
Yˆ
∫ ϕBN
0
f(ϕ)dϕf(Y )dY +
∫ ∞
Y2
∫ ϕBW
0
f(ϕ)dϕf(Y )dY
−
∫ Yˆ
Y1
∫ ϕBN
0
f(ϕ)dϕf(Y )dY −
∫ Y2
Yˆ
∫ ϕBWˆ
0
f(ϕ)dϕf(Y )dY −
∫ ∞
Y2
∫ ϕBWˆ
0
f(ϕ)dϕf(Y )dY =
=
∫ Y2
Yˆ
(∫ ϕBN
ϕBWˆ
f(ϕ)dϕ
)
f(Y )dY +
∫ ∞
Y2
(∫ ϕBW
ϕBWˆ
f(ϕ)dϕ
)
f(Y )dY > 0
since ϕBW > ϕBWˆ ∀ Yi and ϕBN − ϕBWˆ > 0 ∀ Yi > Yˆ .
The share who chooses k = N is
η1 =
∫ Y1
Y=0
f(Y )dY +
∫ Yˆ
Y=Y1
(∫ ∞
ϕ=ϕBN (Y )
f(ϕ)dϕ
)
f(Y )dY. (32)
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The first term is the same as before the reform as specified in (14), while
the second is smaller because of the reduced threshold income, Yˆ < Y2. Hence,
η0 > η1.
The share δ1 who chooses k = W in the reform period is
δ1 =
∫ ∞
Y=Yˆ
(∫ ∞
ϕ=ϕBWˆ (Y )
f(ϕ)dϕ
)
f(Y )dY > δ0. (33)
Since the lower limits in both integrals have lower values after the reform
(Yˆ < Y2 and ϕ
BWˆ (Y ) < ϕBW (Y )), a larger share than before chooses to buy from
the white market, i.e., δ1 > δ0. These effects correspond to the reductions in β
and η shown above.
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B Appendix: Altered behavior after the abo-
lition of the subsidy
If the subsidy is removed in period T , the shares making the different choices
B, W, N will be the following:
βT =
∫ Y2
Y=Y1
(∫ ϕBN (Y )
ϕ=0
f(ϕ)dϕ
)
f(Y )dY +
∫ ∞
Y=Y2
(∫ ϕBW (Y )
ϕ=0
f(ϕ)dϕ
)
f(Y )dY
(34)
> βT−1 =
∫ Yˆ
Y=Y1
(∫ ϕBN (Y )
ϕ=0
f(ϕ)dϕ
)
f(Y )dY +
∫ ∞
Y=Yˆ
(∫ ϕBW (Y )
ϕ=0
f(ϕ)dϕ
)
f(Y )dY
(35)
since Y2 > Yˆ . The share δ who chooses k = W is
δT =
∫ ∞
Y=Y2
(∫ ∞
ϕ=ϕBW (Y )
f(ϕ)dϕ
)
f(Y )dY
< δT−1 =
∫ ∞
Y=Yˆ
(∫ ∞
ϕ=ϕBW (Y )
f(ϕ)dϕ
)
f(Y )dY. (36)
The share who chooses k = N is
ηT =
∫ Y1
Y=0
f(Y )dY +
∫ Y2
Y=Y1
(∫ ∞
ϕ=ϕBN (Y )
f(ϕ)dϕ
)
f(Y )dY
> ηT−1 =
∫ Y1
Y=0
f(Y )dY +
∫ Yˆ
Y=Y1
(∫ ∞
ϕ=ϕBN (Y )
f(ϕ)dϕ
)
f(Y )dY. (37)
Hence, when the subsidy is abolished, there is an immediate drop in δ, which
corresponds to increases in β and η.
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